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Abstract 
The distribution of voting rights in the UK is an artefact of history rather than a product of clear 
legal or philosophical principles. Consequently, some resident aliens have the right to vote in all 
UK elections; others can vote in local elections but are excluded from national elections; still 
others are excluded from all elections. In England and Wales alone roughly 2.3 million immigrants 
are excluded from voting in national elections. This exclusion is inconsistent with the founding 
principle of democracy and distorts political discourse. What if all immigrants could vote in 
national elections? We estimate that up to 95 parliamentary seats could have been won by a 
different party in the 2015 general election. More substantially, enfranchising all immigrants 
would require re-drawing UK constituency boundaries. The new electoral map would increase 
the relative power of urban constituencies and would incentivise some political entrepreneurs 
and parties to temper anti-immigration rhetoric. 
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Introduction 
Universal suffrage is a central pillar of contemporary democracy, yet it does not exist in practice. 
In every country restrictions are placed on who can vote based upon criteria such as citizenship 
status, residence, age, mental disability, and criminality.1 In this paper we examine the 
significance of voting restrictions associated with citizenship status and residence in the UK, as 
well as the profound implications that a change in the law could have. Simply put, we outline the 
arguments for extending the franchise to all resident aliens in the UK and examine how such a 
change might affect the composition of parliament, political discourse and electoral strategy in 
Great Britain. 
We show that current rules regarding who can vote in British elections are a confused relic of 
empire and geopolitical negotiation rather than a logical extension of underlying democratic 
principles. The result is an electorate composed of both citizens and some (but not all) resident 
aliens. This inequality of access to the franchise is inconsistent with the core principle of equality 
that underpins democracy, as is restricting the right of any legal resident alien to vote in UK 
general elections. 
After outlining the case for immigrant suffrage, we estimate the size and geography of the non-
enfranchised adult migrant (NeAM) population in England and Wales in 2015. Our estimates 
suggest that nearly 2.3 million potentially eligible voters were excluded from participation in the 
2015 general election. This is a significant number, especially in the context of Britain’s first-past-
the-post electoral system in which small margins of victory in some constituencies render any 
minority population critical. Indulging in a simple thought experiment, we estimate that 95 
parliamentary seats would have been ‘potential marginals’ in the election if all adult immigrants 
could vote. 
More significantly, reforming the rules governing voting rights such that they were consistent 
with core principles of democracy would require a new electoral map and change the incentives 
of politicians seeking office and political parties seeking to form governments. In short, electoral 
reform would likely tame the toxic anti-immigration rhetoric that has become a central theme in 
contemporary British political discourse. We conclude by arguing that electoral reform is 
required if Britain is to retain its position as an exemplar of democracy in an increasingly mobile 
world. 
The case for immigrant suffrage 
The argument for extending voting rights to legally resident aliens (i.e. immigrants) is intuitively 
clear and well-grounded in political theory: individuals who are (a) de facto members of a 
territorially-delimited economy and society through their physical presence, and (b) directly 
affected by the decisions of the government of that territory, ought to be considered members of 
the polity and granted the right to vote. Selective exclusion from the franchise based on 
citizenship status is non-democratic. 
At the core of this argument is the inclusion principle, which was famously articulated by John 
Stuart Mill:2 
No arrangement of the suffrage…can be permanently satisfactory in which any person or 
class is peremptorily excluded; in which electoral privilege is not open to all persons of full 
age who desire to obtain it. 
Put differently, the foundational principle of democracy is an assumption of political equality 
among adult members of society.3 This principle is enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, 
which contains the following three clauses: 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his [sic] country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.  
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
This wording contains a critical ambiguity: ‘of his [sic] country’. How is the relationship between 
an individual and country defined in practice? Is this right linked to place of birth? Place of 
residence? Place of citizenship? It is generally assumed that voting rights are directly tied to 
citizenship, and this assumption is reflected in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966. Unlike the 
UHDR, which outlines collective normative goals, the ICCPR is meant to be a binding covenant. In 
this document the language relating to voting rights explicitly mentions citizenship: “Every citizen 
shall have the right and the opportunity… (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs… (b) To 
vote and be elected.” 
In this latter formulation voting rights are explicitly linked to citizenship status, which is both 
inconsistent with current democratic practice in the UK (and many other signatories to the 
ICCPR) and incompatible with the spirit of political equality and universal suffrage articulated in 
the UDHR. 
As Table 1 shows, in practice voting rights in the UK are linked to neither citizenship nor any 
other clear legal or moral principle. Instead, the allocation of voting rights reflects a history of 
negotiated political inclusion associated with an imperial past and, more recently, partial 
integration with Europe. Resident aliens from the Republic of Ireland and Commonwealth 
countries have full voting rights in the UK (this includes countries such as Mozambique, Papua-
New Guinea and Rwanda that were never part of the British Empire but have recently joined the 
Commonwealth); those from Europe have partial rights (they can vote in local government but 
not parliamentary elections, and they have been excluded from voting in referendums); those 
from other countries have none. Many other democratic countries exhibit similarly complex 
arrangements with regard to voting rights.4 
 
[Table 1. Who can vote in the UK?] 
 
Evidence of historically contingent allocations of voting rights highlights a peculiar fact about the 
history of democratic theory and practice noted by political theorist Robert Dahl:5   
[H]ow to decide who legitimately make up “the people” and hence are entitled to govern 
themselves…is a problem almost totally neglected by all the great political philosophers 
who wrote about democracy.  
This conceptual ambiguity at the heart of democracy has become known as the ‘boundary 
problem’ in political theory and is particularly relevant to the question of immigrant suffrage.6 In 
both theory and practice, citizenship is not a satisfactory solution to the boundary problem as it 
is effectively an arbitrary attribute and increasingly a mechanism of political exclusion in an age 
of increased population mobility. Citizenship may be granted and revoked by a sovereign more 
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or less at will and bears no automatic relationship to de facto membership in a society. For 
example, in the UK two individuals with identical careers, salaries, tax status and residential 
status can be treated differently when it comes to political rights. There is no clear moral or 
philosophical justification for this differential treatment under the democratic presumption of 
equality of persons. 
Recent efforts by political theorists to resolve the boundary problem and establish a clear, 
coherent principle for defining the demos in contemporary democracies revolve around the 
‘principle of affected interests’. In its simplest form, this principle states that anyone who is 
affected by the decisions of a government ought to have a right to participate in that government 
directly (e.g. by standing for office) or indirectly (by participating in the election of 
representatives).7 From this starting point, two lines of argument have emerged. 
The first represents a radical interpretation of the affected interest principle and states that 
anyone, anywhere in the world, ought to have a right to participate in the decisions of 
governments that affect them or might affect them.8 By this logic, anyone in the world potentially 
affected by the decisions of the UK government—e.g. on trade, monetary policy or military 
action—would have a right to vote in UK elections. Even the related but more restrictive ‘coercion 
principle’, which links political rights to direct subjugation to state authority, opens the door for 
citizens residing in foreign countries with active UK military operations to vote in UK elections. 
Extending this line of reasoning further, scholars such as David Held have argued for a global 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ in which all people are conceptualised as part of a universal demos and 
nation states become obsolete. In short, this solution to the boundary problem rejects boundaries 
altogether.9 
The second line of argument remains more firmly rooted in the geographic realities of 
contemporary political organization. Practically speaking, history has delivered a system of states 
that have proven (at the best of times) effective in delivering the promise of democracy. This 
capability is linked to solidarity and trust, and the proximity of elected representatives to clear, 
spatially-bounded constituencies.10  Scholars in this tradition believe scale matters when it comes 
to ensuring the preconditions for democracy. This perspective doesn’t conflict with visions of 
multiscale governance, where political institutions exist above nation states to serve the interests 
of broader publics, but it does argue for territorially-bounded definitions of the demos as a basic 
unit of political organization. 
This latter, more pragmatic line of argument leaves us with the question of who, within a given 
political territory, ought to have the right to vote. Applying the affected interest principle is now 
more straightforward, and it becomes evident that all resident aliens should be granted voting 
rights. As tenants or homeowners, workers, tax payers and individuals directly subject to the 
coercive apparatus of the state, immigrants clearly have a direct stake in many of the decisions 
that a government might take. Or, as Lardy put it: “resident aliens have as many interests to 
protect as resident citizens”.11 In short, the affected interest principle applies to migrants by 
virtue of their territorial presence and residence.  
Following this logic, and taking into consideration some complexities in applying it in practice, 
we propose the following criteria for inclusion in the UK demos: (a) all adults with a proven 
residence and legal presence in the United Kingdom, and (b) any adult UK citizen residing abroad 
with a proven and direct material interest in the UK.12 Anybody satisfying either criterion has a 
clear stake in UK government decisions and remains subject to the coercive authority of the state. 
The legal presence criterion is included to prevent (for example) a non-UK citizen from 
purchasing (but not inhabiting) an official residence in the UK for the sole purpose of political 
influence. The appropriate criteria for satisfying this requirement would need working out but 
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could draw on the existing rule for those on work visas in the UK: a minimum presence on UK soil 
of 180 days per year.   
This simple set of criteria has a sound theoretical basis and is far more consistent with the ideals 
of democracy outlined in the UDHR than the current arrangements, which clearly violate the 
principles of inclusion and equality at the very core of liberal democracy as a system of political 
organization. 
Estimates of the scale and geography of immigrant political exclusion 
Using our proposed criteria for inclusion in the UK electorate, we have estimated the number of 
non-enfranchised adult migrants (NeAMs) in England and Wales in 2015. The two countries 
together contained 88 percent of the UK’s overall registered electorate in May of that year. We 
were not able to make comparable estimates for Northern Ireland and Scotland due to differences 
in the source data. (The registered electorate in NI was 1,236,765 in 2015; it was 4,099,532 in 
Scotland. The total number of registered electors in the UK for the 2015 general election was 
46,354,197.)  
The NeAM population was estimated by drawing on passport information recorded in the 2011 
census of England and Wales. Every individual aged 15+ in that year was counted as this 
represents a plausible estimate of the voting-age population of immigrants in 2015. In total there 
were roughly 3.4 million potential immigrant voters in 2011. Just over 1 million of these were 
Commonwealth or Irish citizens and therefore eligible to vote. The remaining individuals were 
holders of either an EU passport, or a passport from a non-EU country that rendered that 
individual ineligible to vote in either parliamentary elections or the 2016 referendum regarding 
leaving the EU. This left nearly 2.3 million non-enfranchised adult migrants (Table 2). (These 
estimates are conservative. According to a UK Labour Market report published by the ONS in July 
2016 the number of non-UK nationals working in the UK between January and March 2016 was 
3.3 million, of which 2.15 were EU nationals. However, these numbers are not reported at 
subnational scale and therefore do not allow us to apply the geographic analysis permitted by use 
of Census figures.) 
 
[Table 2. Estimate of non-enfranchised adult migrants (NeAMs) in 2015] 
 
The NeAM population of England and Wales was therefore roughly equivalent to the entire 
registered electorate of Wales in 2015 (2.28 million) and nearly twice the size of the registered 
electorate of Northern Ireland (1.2 million). Overall, the NeAM population represents 
approximately 5% of the total potentially enfranchisable adult population of England and Wales 
and is therefore the single largest group of intentionally non-enfranchised adults in the whole of 
the UK.13 
However, the significance of this political exclusion is not merely a question of size but also of 
geography. The migrant population of the UK is not evenly spread across space but rather 
clustered in certain areas. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of NeAMs by Parliamentary 
constituency in England and Wales using an equal area cartogram with each constituency 
represented by a hexagon of identical size. The single largest concentration is found in London, 
where roughly 945,000 NeAMs live. Other significant clusters include large urban centres such as 
Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, Bournemouth, Bristol, Oxford and Slough. There are also some 
rural concentrations in the farming areas north of Cambridgeshire and in south Lincolnshire. 
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[Figure 1. Estimated number of non-enfranchised immigrants by constituency in 2015] 
 
Practical implications of political reform 
This geographical distribution matters when it comes to evaluating the potential effects of 
adopting the more philosophically consistent and inclusive definition of the demos articulated 
above. To illustrate why, we introduced a thought experiment: If immigrants could have voted in 
the 2015 general election, how might the results have been affected?  
To answer this question we estimated the potential number of ‘marginal’ constituencies in 
England and Wales in 2015 if all adult migrants had had the right to vote. This was done by 
calculating the ratio of NeAMs per constituency to the margin of victory in that constituency using 
raw vote counts. So, for example, if there were 1000 NeAMs in a given constituency and the 
winner of that constituency had received 2000 more votes than the runner up, the ratio would be 
0.5 and this would not be considered a ‘potential marginal’. If, however, there were more NeAMs 
than the margin of victory then the ratio would be greater than 1. In this latter case, the 
constituency would be counted as a 'potential marginal’—i.e. one where the outcome could 
theoretically have been different if NeAMs were granted the right to vote. A summary of estimates 
is presented in Table 3; all potential marginal constituencies are mapped in Figure 2 with an equal 
area cartogram. In total, there were 95 potential marginals in 2015; in 47 of these the number of 
NeAMs outnumbered the margin of victory by more than 2:1.  
 
[Table 3. Ratio NeAMs to the margin of victory in the 2015 general election] 
 
While this thought experiment usefully highlights the extent to which NeAMs could hypothetically 
influence political outcomes, it is unrealistic if we consider the full consequences of enfranchising 
2.3 million more people in England and Wales. 
For a start, each Member of Parliament (MP) is theoretically meant to represent a roughly 
equivalent number of electors (currently ~75,000 +/- 5% according to our estimates). Adding 2.3 
million people to the electoral roll would therefore require either an addition of 30 MPs to the 
House of Commons or an increase in the number of electors represented by each MP. Given 
current plans to reduce the number of MPs in parliament from 650 to 600, the latter outcome 
would be most likely. 
Either way, a new electoral map would be required. Legislation passed in 2011 and being 
implemented in 2016 requires, for the first time, that all constituencies have electorates within 
+/-5 per cent of the national quota or average. Given this equivalence criterion for drawing 
constituency boundaries the existing ones would have to be revised. The consequences would be 
most significant in large urban areas where the vast majority of migrants are concentrated. For 
example, under the planned reduction to 600 MPs, the Greater London County is currently slated 
to receive 68 MPs.14 According to our calculations, if the NeAM population were granted the right 
to vote London would need to have 77 out of the 600 MPs. Similarly, the number of MPs in the 
West Midlands would increase from 52 to 53 under the new arrangement, increasing the 
representation of constituencies in and around Birmingham. Consequently, the new electoral 
map would increase the relative weight of urban constituencies in Parliament. This is particularly 
significant given that urban areas have systematically been under-represented in the UK because 
of under-registration of certain groups within society who are concentrated in the country’s 
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major urban centres—especially young adults, recent movers, tenants of privately-rented 
properties and members of ethnic minorities. If NeAMs are included as legitimate members of the 
UK polity, their concentration in the main urban centres – especially London – means that their 
addition to the electoral register would further re-balance the geography of representation in the 
House of Commons towards those centres.  
 
[Figure 2. Ratio of non-enfranchised immigrants to margin of victory in the 2015 
election] 
 
More importantly, enfranchising all adult migrants would change the incentive landscape faced 
by competitive centrist political parties. At present, politicians have little incentive to address the 
needs and concerns of the 2.3 million non-enfranchised adult migrants in England and Wales. As 
Sarah Song has argued, “Because noncitizens lack voting rights, it is easy for political parties, 
candidates, and elected officials to ignore them”.15 
In the UK politicians have not only ignored immigrants but actually used public concern about 
immigration as a political tool for cultivating support in elections. Many studies have shown that 
individuals’ actual personal economic circumstances do not correlate strongly with attitudes 
towards immigration, but perceptions of the volume of immigrant flows and the potential threat 
posed by migrants do. Hainmueller and Hopkins summarise this body of research neatly: 
“Prospective voters formulate their opinions on immigration based on perceptions of its national 
impact rather than reasoning from their personal economic situation”.16 These perceptions are 
shaped by media reports and elite rhetoric (e.g. campaign stump speeches), which in turn stoke 
fears about migration and incentivise political entrepreneurs to place the issue at the heart of 
their campaigns.17 The significant rise in concern about migration in the UK since the turn of the 
millennium is therefore likely to be partly a function of tactical anti-immigration discourse on the 
part of competing politicians.  What is beyond doubt is that both of the main political parties in 
the UK have highlighted immigration as a significant issue, and the rise of the UK Independence 
Party signals the extent to which public perception has moved in this direction. This was clearly 
reflected campaigns for the UK to leave the European Union in 2016, which focused substantially 
on the claimed negative consequences of large-scale immigration. 
Consider, then, what might happen if 2.3 million currently disenfranchised immigrants could 
vote? Given the size and geography of this group of voters there would be two likely outcomes. 
On the one hand, the two main parties might choose to temper their anti-immigration rhetoric in 
order to appeal to these voters. On the other, marginal parties (e.g. the Liberal Democrats in the 
UK, which is explicitly pro-immigration) or new political entrepreneurs may target urban areas 
with large immigrant voting blocs. In closely fought elections, these parties could hold the balance 
of power if a coalition were necessary. 
In sum, enfranchising all resident adults in the UK would change the electoral map, increase the 
relative voice in Parliament of those living in large cities, and change the incentives of politicians 
seeking office and parties looking to form a government. Collectively, these effects would render 
the system more truly democratic than it is today. 
Conclusion 
In June 2016 the UK held a referendum on whether or not to break away from the European 
Union. After losing a legal challenge, the 2.15 million adult EU citizens living and working in 
Britain at the time of the election were not permitted to vote in that referendum.18 The Leave 
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campaign won by a margin of 1,269,501 votes—a significant margin, but one that could easily 
have been reversed if resident EU citizens had been granted the right to vote in a referendum in 
which they had a clear, direct and personal interest. Their exclusion from the vote is in direct 
conflict with the underlying principles of democracy.  
The rapid expansion of the UK’s immigrant population since 1997 has resulted in an increasingly 
distorted political system in which a sizeable share of the adult population lacks political voice. 
This lack of voice has created a vulnerable population that is increasingly treated as a universal 
scapegoat for social, economic and security concerns. This is an untenable arrangement if the UK 
is to remain an exemplar of democratic practice. Nearly 20 years ago Heather Lardy made the 
following observation:19 
In a world of increasing international migration, the exclusion from the electorate of large 
numbers of resident aliens is a matter of deep concern. Their exclusion can only serve to 
intensify the sense of isolation experienced by non-legal citizens, and to weaken the 
democratic legitimacy of the political communities from which they are excluded. 
Since that time the number of resident migrants working in the UK has more than tripled, the 
political establishment has been rocked by a series of unexpected electoral outcomes, and the 
British public has become increasingly distrustful and fearful of outsiders—sentiments re-
enforced by tactical political discourse. The integrity of British democracy is under threat in this 
age of increased international mobility; electoral reform is necessary to save it. 
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Table 1. Who can vote in the UK? 
  Local elections 
Parliamentary 
elections 
Commonwealth citizens resident in the UK Yes Yes 
Irish citizens resident in UK Yes Yes 
EU citizens resident in UK Yes No 
All other resident aliens No No 
 
 
Table 2. Estimate of non-enfranchised adult migrants (NeAMs)015 
Potentially eligible voters 43,126,440 
Actual registered electors (2015) 41,017,900 
Total adult immigrant residents 3,370,681 
Commonwealth & Irish citizens 1,075,633 
EU citizens 1,521,050 
Non-EU/CW/Irish residents 773,998 
Total non-enfranchised adult migrants 2,295,048 
Source: Calculations based on data from ONS (2011) 
 
 
 
Table 3. Ratio of NeAMs to the margin of victory in the 2015 general election 
Ratio (Migrants/Margin) N Constituencies 
<1.0 478 
1.0-1.9 48 
2.0-3.9 22 
<4.0 25 
Total potential marginals 95 
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Figure 1. Estimated number of non-enfranchised immigrants by constituency in 2015 
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Figure 2. Ratio of non-enfranchised immigrants to margin of victory in the 2015 election 
 
